Lectures · Lecture 1

1.1

When a discussion once arose about the demonstrations that young men ought to hear from philosophers in order to grasp what they are learning, Musonius said that it was not fitting to seek many demonstrations for each matter, but effective and clear ones. For that physician is not praiseworthy, he said, who administers many drugs to the sick, but the one who benefits them in a way worthy of note through the few things he administers. Nor is he a philosopher who teaches his hearers through many demonstrations, but the one who leads them through few to the point at which he aims. And the hearer, the more intelligent he is, so much the more quickly will he assent to the main point of the argument, provided it is sound. But whoever demands demonstration everywhere, even where matters are clear, or wishes to have proved to himself through many arguments what can be proved through few, is altogether absurd and slow to learn. Now it is reasonable that the gods need no demonstration for anything, since nothing is unclear or unknown to them, which is the only sort of thing that requires demonstrations. But human beings must seek to discover what is not evident and not immediately known through what is evident and manifest, which is exactly the task of demonstration. For example, that pleasure is not a good does not seem to be immediately known, since pleasure in fact invites us as though it were a good. But if someone takes the known premise that every good is worthy of choice, and adds to this another premise, likewise known, that some pleasures are not worthy of choice, we demonstrate that pleasure is not a good—through what is known, that which is not known. Again, that toil is not an evil does not immediately appear plausible; for the opposite of this seems more plausible, that toil is an evil. But when the evident premise is laid down, that every evil is to be avoided, and there is added to it the more evident one, that many toils are not to be avoided, the conclusion is reached that toil is not an evil . . . of the demonstration, since some human beings are sharper and others duller, and some have been reared in better habits, others in worse, and those of a worse character or nature would need more demonstrations and greater effort in order to receive these doctrines and be molded in accordance with them—just as, I think, unsound bodies too, when they are to be in good condition, require very great care. But those of the young who are better endowed and have shared in a better upbringing would assent to what is rightly said, and follow it, more easily and more quickly and through few demonstrations.

1.2

That these things are so, he said, we would readily understand if we imagined a boy or a young man—the one reared in every kind of luxury, his body made soft and his soul enfeebled by habits that lead toward weakness, and moreover showing himself sluggish and slow to learn by nature; and the other, on the contrary, brought up in a somewhat Spartan manner, not accustomed to luxury, practiced in endurance, and readily attentive to what is rightly said. Then, if we set these two young men to listen to a philosopher speaking about death, about toil, about poverty, and about similar things, that they are not evils, and again about life, about pleasure, about wealth, and about things akin to these, that they are not goods—will both of them alike welcome and be persuaded by what is said? It cannot be affirmed. Rather, the more sluggish one would perhaps scarcely and slowly, and as if pried loose by countless arguments, at last give his assent; while the other will quickly and readily receive what is said, as belonging to him and befitting him, requiring neither many demonstrations nor greater effort.

1.3

Or was that Spartan boy not of this sort, the one who asked Cleanthes the philosopher whether toil is a good? For he clearly was so well endowed by nature and so well reared toward virtue that he considered toil to be nearer to the nature of the good than to that of evil; indeed, taking it as agreed that toil is not an evil, he asked whether it happens to be a good. And so Cleanthes, admiring the boy, said to him: "You are of the blood of a noble race, dear child, such things you speak." How, then, could such a one not be easily persuaded neither to fear poverty nor death nor any other of the things that seem fearsome, and again not to pursue wealth or life or pleasure? But to return to the beginning of the discussion, I say that the teacher of philosophy must not seek to go through a multitude of arguments and demonstrations before his students, but must speak effectively about each matter and reach the mind of the hearer, and say things that . . . are persuasive and not easily overturned, and above all by presenting himself, in his conduct concerning these things, as one who handles his hearers by this means; while the student must be intent upon what is said, and take care that he does not unawares accept something false, and, by Zeus, not seek to hear many demonstrations of what is true, but clear ones; and whatever of the counsels he is persuaded are his own and true, these he must follow up in his life. For only in this way will anyone be benefited by philosophy, if to the arguments he has accepted, which are sound, he renders his deeds in harmony.