5
Once again a question arose among us: whether habit or reason is more effective for the acquisition of virtue, assuming that reason teaches correctly what one ought to do, while habit consists in becoming accustomed to act according to such reason. To Musonius it seemed that habit was the more effective, and, advocating his own view, he questioned one of those present in this way: "Suppose there are two physicians, one of whom is capable of speaking about medical matters as expertly as possible, but who has no practice in treating the sick, while the other is unable to speak, yet is accustomed to treat patients according to the principles of medicine; which of them," he said, "would you rather have at your side when you were ill?" And the man answered that he would choose the one accustomed to treating. And Musonius said: "What then? Of two men, one who has sailed often and has already piloted a good many ships, and the other who has sailed rarely and has never piloted at all—if this one who has never piloted speaks most expertly about the manner in which one must pilot, while the other speaks inadequately and altogether feebly, which of them would you use as your pilot when sailing?" And he said, the one who has piloted often. Again Musonius said: "Of two musicians, one who knows the theory of music and expounds it most persuasively, but who is unable to sing or to play the cithara or the lyre, and the other who is inferior in theory, but plays the cithara and the lyre well, and also sings—to which of them would you entrust a musical task, or which of them would you wish to become the teacher of music for a child who does not know it?" And he answered, the one who is capable in performance. "What then," said Musonius, "since these matters stand thus: with regard to self-control or self-mastery, is it not far better to become self-controlled and moderate in all that one does than to be able to say what one ought?" Here too the young man agreed that to speak adequately about self-control is a lesser and poorer thing than to be self-controlled in deed. Whereupon Musonius, connecting this with what had been said before, asked: "How then, in the light of these cases, could knowing the theory of each matter be better than becoming accustomed to and doing the things according to the guidance of reason? For habit leads toward being able to act, whereas knowing the theory of a thing leads toward being able to speak. For reason does indeed cooperate with action too, by teaching how one must act, and it is prior in order to habit—for it is not possible to be habituated to anything noble unless one is habituated according to reason; yet in power habit is prior to reason, because it is more authoritative in leading a person to actions than reason is."