Lectures · Lecture 8

8.1

Once, when one of the kings from Syria came to visit him — for at that time there were still kings in Syria subject to the Romans — he said many things to the man, and among them these. Do not suppose, he said, that it is more fitting for anyone else to pursue philosophy than for you, nor for any reason more than because you happen to be a king. For surely the king must be able to preserve and benefit human beings; and the one who is to preserve and benefit must understand what is good for a human being and what is bad, what is beneficial and what is harmful, and what is advantageous and what is disadvantageous. For it is those who fall into evils who are destroyed, while those who obtain good things are preserved; and those who are granted what is beneficial and advantageous are benefited, while those who are cast into what is disadvantageous and harmful are harmed. Now good and bad, or advantageous and disadvantageous, or beneficial and harmful, it belongs to no one else to discern than to the philosopher, who is continually occupied with precisely this, so as to be ignorant of not even one of these things, and has made it his art to know what leads toward a human being's happiness or unhappiness. For this reason it is evident that the king must pursue philosophy. And moreover it is fitting for the king — indeed it is necessary for him — to award to his subjects what is just, so that no one has more or less than his desert, but that those who deserve honor and those who deserve punishment obtain them. But how could anyone ever be able to do these things without being just? And how could anyone be just without understanding justice, what sort of thing it is? So here again the king must pursue philosophy, since he could not be shown to have come to know justice and the just in any other way, unless he pursued philosophy. For it cannot be said that the one who has learned will not know just things better than the one who has not learned, nor that all who have not pursued philosophy are not ignorant of such matters. At any rate, they quarrel and go to war with one another about what is just, some asserting that these things are more just, others that those are. And yet about the things people understand, they do not disagree: neither about what is white or black, nor hot or cold, nor soft or hard; but about these things everyone thinks and speaks in the same way. So they would likewise be in agreement about just things too, if indeed they knew what they are; but insofar as they do not agree, they are evidently ignorant.

8.2

And you too, as I think, are not free of this ignorance. Therefore you must attend to this knowledge more than anyone else, and all the more so inasmuch as it is more shameful for a man who is a king than for a private person to be in ignorance of justice. Furthermore, then, the king must himself be self-controlled, and he must make his subjects self-controlled, so that the one may rule with self-control and the others be ruled in an orderly way, and neither party live in luxury; for luxury is ruinous to a ruler and to every private person alike. But how could anyone be self-controlled himself without having practiced mastering his desires, or, being licentious, make others self-controlled? Yet what branch of knowledge leads toward self-control except philosophy, one cannot say; for it teaches one to be above pleasure, teaches one to be above greed, teaches one to cherish frugality, teaches one to flee extravagance, accustoms one to have a sense of shame, accustoms one to master the tongue, and instills order and discipline and decorum and, in general, what is fitting in movement and bearing. And these things, when they belong to a person, make him dignified and self-controlled. And indeed a king too, in whom these things are present, would most of all be worthy of a god and worthy of reverence. Now fearlessness and steadfastness and courage are the work of bravery, but how could these belong to a person in any other way more than if one gained a strong conviction about death and hardship, that they are not evils? For these are precisely the things that unsettle and frighten human beings — death and hardship — whenever they are convinced that they are evils; but that these are not evils philosophy alone teaches. So that if indeed bravery is to be acquired by kings, and to be acquired more than anything else whatever, they must attend to pursuing philosophy, since they could not become brave in any other way. And indeed it is kingly, if anything is, to be unconquered in argument and to be able to master, as with weapons those who fight, so with arguments those who dispute; for insofar as kings are weak in this respect, they must often be led astray and forced to admit what is false as true, which is the work of foolishness and of the utmost ignorance. And I do not know whether philosophy is naturally suited to provide anything more than this to those who pursue it, namely, to prevail in argument over those near them and to distinguish the false from the true and to refute the one and confirm the other.

8.3

The orators, at any rate, whenever they come into the same place as the philosophers and give and receive an argument, one may see them thrown into confusion and at a loss, forced to contradict themselves. And yet, whenever the orators — those who have made it their work to practice speeches — are shown to be weaker in argument than the philosophers, what should we suppose about the rest of humankind? Hence, if any king has a desire for supremacy in argument, he must pursue philosophy, so that on this ground too he need not fear anyone as likely to get the better of him, since it is fitting that the king be everywhere fearless and confident and unconquered. But in general, the good king must of all necessity be, in word and in deed, without fault and complete, if indeed he is to be, as the ancients supposed, a living law, contriving good order and concord, warding off lawlessness and faction, an emulator of Zeus and, like him, a father to those he rules. But how could anyone be such a man unless he was endowed with a superior nature, educated in the best education, and possessed of all the virtues that befit a human being? Now if there is also some other branch of knowledge that guides a human being's nature toward virtue and teaches him to train in and pursue what is noble, then it would have to be set side by side and compared — whether that one or philosophy is the stronger and more sufficient to produce a good king; and the king, if indeed he wishes to be good, would reasonably make use of the stronger. But if no other art even claims to hand down and to teach virtue — but some are concerned only with the human body and what is useful to it, while those that do touch upon the soul examine everything more than the source from which it will attain self-control — and philosophy alone examines this and contrives this, namely, how a human being might escape vice and acquire virtue: if this is how these things stand, what could be more advantageous for a king, at least for one who wishes to be good, than to pursue philosophy? Rather, how and in what manner could anyone reign or live nobly, unless he pursued philosophy? For my part, I think that the good king is at once, of necessity, also a philosopher, and that the philosopher is at once also kingly. But let us first consider the former point. Is there any way in which someone could be a good king without being a good man?

8.4

One cannot say that there is. But if someone is a good man, would he not also be a philosopher? Yes, by Zeus, if indeed philosophizing is the pursuit of nobility and goodness. So the good king is at once, of necessity, found to be a philosopher as well. And moreover, that the philosopher too is altogether kingly, you might learn in this way. For it surely belongs to the kingly man to be able to govern nations and cities well and to be worthy to rule over human beings. And who could be either a more capable protector of a city or more worthy to rule over human beings than the philosopher? For it befits him — provided he is truly a philosopher — to be prudent, self-controlled, high-minded, a good judge of what is just and of what is fitting, effective in carrying out what he has resolved, steadfast in hardships; and in addition to these he would be confident, fearless, able to withstand what seem to be terrors, and still further, beneficent, kind, humane. Of such a man, who could be found more suited or more able to rule? No one. And if he does not have many who obey and are persuaded by him, he is not for that reason deprived of being kingly; for it is enough even to rule over one's friends who are at hand, or a wife and children, or, by Zeus, even oneself alone. For the physician is no less a physician who treats a few than the one who treats many, if indeed he has the physician's skill; and the musician is no less a musician who teaches a few than the one who teaches many, if indeed he has music; and the horseman likewise, the one who makes use of one or two horses is no less a horseman than the one who makes use of many, provided he is knowledgeable in horsemanship; and so too the kingly man, the one who has one or two who are persuaded by him is a king in the same way as the one who has acquired many subjects: only let him have the skill of ruling, and he would be kingly. For this reason it seems to me that Socrates too calls philosophy the political and kingly science, because the one who has taken it up is at once a statesman. When Musonius had said such things, the king, delighted with the discourse, acknowledged that he was grateful for what had been said to him, and in return for these things, he said, ask of me whatever you wish, for I would not refuse you in anything. Musonius then said, I ask you to conform to and follow these arguments which you praise; for in this way you will most of all gratify me, and you yourself will be benefited in no other way more.